Appellate Advocacy and Decisionmaking in State
Appellate Courts in the Twenty-First Century
Hon. James H. Coleman,Jr.*
I am the sixth justice on our seven person court in terms of seniority. Therefore, my remarks may not represent the views of other
members of my court. Indeed, in a given case, they may not even
represent my own views. Nonetheless, I will endeavor to unravel the
mystery still surrounding the workings of appellate courts.
The adversarial system, created for the case-by-case administration of law, of which the appellate courts are a part, is structured like
a tripod. In addition to the parties, the participants are (1) the lawyers for both the plaintiffs and the defendants, (2) a single neutral
judge at the trial level, and (3) multiple neutral judges or justices at,
the appellate level. Although the foundation for an appeal is established in the trial courts, my remarks will focus on the appellate
process in state courts--that of advocacy and decisionmaking in the
context of products liability cases.
Each state, as well as the District of Columbia, has a court of last
resort. Forty-seven states use "Supreme Court" in their highest
courts' titles and identify their members as 'justices."' The District of
Columbia, Maryland, and New York use "Court of Appeals" in their
highest courts' titles rather than "Supreme Court," and they refer to
their members as "judges."2
I.

HYPOTHETICAL FACTS

As points of reference, let us consider two hypothetical cases. In
the first case, A'sjob required him to clean a cheese and meat slicing
machine. The machine was manufactured and sold in 1980. He was
instructed to remove the blade guard and to leave the machine runAssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of NewJersey. This article
is an adaptation of a speech presented at the ALI-ABA 4th Annual Products Liability Course,
February 12-13, 1998, in Scottsdale, Arizona.
SeeJohn B. Wefing, State Supreme Courtjustices: Who Are They?, 32 NEW ENG. L.

REv. 49, 50 nn.6-7 (1997).
2

See id.
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ning in order to clean it quickly and thoroughly. While cleaning the
machine in February 1994, A was involved in an accident. Four of his
fingers were severed when they came into contact with the revolving
unguarded blade. He sued the manufacturer on two theories of liability. (1) a design defect because the machine lacked an interlock
guard that would prevent its operation when the guard was removed
from the blade and (2) a warning defect based on the assertion that
(a) no labels, manuals, or place cards were provided to warn a user
of the danger and (b) adequate warnings were not supplied during
the period between the sale in 1980 and A's injury in 1994.
Ajury credited A's design defect claim and awarded him three
million dollars. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The
state supreme court accepted the manufacturer's petition for review,
limited, however, to the defective design issue.
In the second hypothetical case, B purchased a new luxury boat
from a boat dealer. Three months after the purchase, the boat was
destroyed by an electrical fire. No other property was damaged, and
no one sustained personal injuries. B filed a products liability claim
against the manufacturer, alleging that the electrical system was defectively designed. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that a
purchaser could not maintain an action in strict liability for economic loss to the product itself. The intermediate appellate court
disagreed and reinstated the complaint. The state supreme court
granted the manufacturer's petition for review.
Although both hypothetical cases involve a design defect theory
in products liability law, I will focus on the process typically followed
by the highest court in a state in arriving at its decision rather than
forecasting what the outcome should be. In other words, I will discuss how decisional law is made.
II. BRIEFS

Once a state's highest court has accepted an appeal, the next
step in the process is to prepare the merits briefs. I regard brief writing as a science and an art. Logic, organization, and coherence are
essential. A brief writer should strive quickly to capture the intended
audience. When reviewing the factual and procedural history, the
writer should remember that from the perspective of an appellate
judge, the cold trial record "is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither
the substance nor the flavor of the peach before it was dried." 4 Lu-

See, e.g., Alloway v. General Marine Indus., 149 N.J. 620, 695 A.2d 264 (1997).
Trusky v. Ford Motor Co., 19 N.J. Super. 100, 104, 88 A.2d 235, 237 (App.
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gubrious recitation of unnecessary procedural and factual statements
should be avoided.
State the issues early, clearly, accurately, and concisely. They
should be articulated in a manner that tends to pull the court toward
your conclusion. Present your strongest points first to try to capture
votes early. The brief writer has a unique and uninterrupted opportunity to accomplish that objective. Doing otherwise creates the risk
that an appellant's brief will be cast aside in favor of a respondent's
brief. Briefs should be thorough in terms of applicable, controlling
and helpful precedents, scholarly articles, learned treatises, and outof-state authority. These sources should give the court the benefit of
the leading scholarship on the subject as well as the Restatement of the
Law if available. Thoroughness does not equate with filing overlong
briefs.
Many products liability cases are complicated. Interpretation
and application of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Tmt in
light of a jurisdiction's existing public policy often leads to longer
and more elaborate briefs. The same can be expected regarding section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability." Complicated cases, by necessity, require briefs and oral arguments to be
focused.
The brief for the manufacturer of the slicing machine would
likely argue that the court should follow the newly adopted section
2(b). The brief would likely urge the court to reverse the jury award
because the plaintiff failed to establish that a reasonable alternative
design was available when the machine was manufactured and sold
in 1980. The manufacturer would argue in the alternative that, even
if section 2(b) is not adopted by the court, a reversal is required under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts because the
plaintiff failed to satisfy either the consumer expectations test or the
risk/utility standard.
The brief for the manufacturer of the boat would likely argue
that the court should adopt section 21 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability. That section "defines economic loss to exclude recovery under tort theories for damage to a product itself."7
In addition, the brief would argue that the Uniform Commercial
Code provides the most appropriate remedy for economic loss to the
product caused by a defective design. Those two appeals would be
Div. 1952).
See RFSTAITMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1977).
SeRFSrATEmENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILlY§ 2(b) (1997).

AUoway, 149 N.J. at 636, 695 A.2d at 272.
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listed for oral argument back-to-back on the same day before the
highest court in the jurisdiction.
III. ORAL ARGUMENT
Many times, the argument of an appeal is the climax of the case.
Most appellate courts in this country permit some form of oral argument, either by order of the court or at the request of an attorney
for one of the parties. In NewJersey, a timely request by counsel for
either party requires the intermediate appellate court to hear oral
argument. All appeals before the New Jersey Supreme Court are argued.
In NewJersey, the chief justice presides over oral arguments in
the supreme court and the presiding judge of a panel presides over
oral arguments in the intermediate appellate court. The NewJersey
appellate courts, and, I suspect, most throughout the country, are
"hot courts." That means most appellate judges have read the briefs
in advance of oral arguments.
Nevertheless, oral arguments serve several important purposes.
First, they afford the court and counsel an opportunity to explain
matters that are ambiguous, unclear, or missing from the appendices. Second, they afford the attorneys an opportunity to answer the
questions a judge or justice might have after studying the briefs and
the record in the case. The New Jersey Supreme Court permits attorneys to use the first five minutes of oral argument to present an
overview of the case without interruption for questions. After making the opening statement, an oral advocate should remember that
judges and justices like a dialogue more than a monologue/lecture.
A lawyer must be prepared to present his or her arguments with
precision. Unlike the five days Daniel Webster and other counsel
consumed when arguing Gibbons v. Ogden before the United States
Supreme Court in February 1824, appellate courts today operate
more efficiently. In a typical case in NewJersey, each side is allowed
thirty minutes to argue. The time restraints are imposed not because
of the court's increasing impatience with oral arguments, but rather
because of the increase in the business of the court. Court opinions
often will be more concise than the 210 pages in the Gibbons decision.
There are gradations in the tone and style of questioning during oral arguments. It should not be viewed as a period of entertainment. "Oratorical frippery" should be avoided. After one oral
8 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).

1998]

STATE APPELLATE COUR1

1085

advocate repeated that he was being "perfectly honest" with the
court, our late Chief Justice Wilentz was prompted to say "you will
tell us when you are not being perfectly honest as well, won't you?"
Justices are no longer passive during oral argument. Oral argument at the Wisconsin Supreme Court was, at one time, described
as being so quiet that you could hear the justices' arteries clog."
Former Wisconsin Chief Justice Marvin B. Rosenberry is credited
with telling the story of a farmer and his son visiting the court during
oral argument one hot summer afternoon. After counsel had argued for sometime, a fly landed on the brow of a justice, who waved

it away. When the justice waved the fly away a second time, "the
farmer's boy nudged his father and exclaimed quite excitedly, 'Look,
Dad, one of them is alive!'"'" I think it is safe to say that the era of a
quiet bench in both federal and state appellate courts ended at least
a decade ago.
An oral advocate should be prepared to respond to hypothetical
questions posing slightly different factual scenarios from that before
the court. If an advocate's research reveals that the court in the past
has been split on the same or similar issues presented in the advocate's case, an advocate should assume the split will continue. If one
or more new members have been added to the court since a relevant
decision was rendered, an advocate should attempt to gain the sympathy of the newer judge or justice without offending a perceived
sympathetic vote. This is indeed a delicate balancing act.
In a multijudge or multi-justice court, an oral advocate must be
cautious about what he or she concedes, or the way he or she answers
questions. Advocates should never give an answer simply to please
the questioner. What pleases one member of the court may displease another. A justice who has been displeased by an oral advocate may have been the vote needed to win. The advocate should
take care not to tip the scale in favor of an adversary.
Typically, a lawyer must distill into a thirty minute argument all
the reasons why that lawyer's client should prevail. Intense questioning by the court may cause the attorney to feel that the arguments
were not effective. That feeling can be reduced by good preparation,
including rehearsal strategies, such as being grilled with the kinds of
questions one might expect to receive from the court. Ideally, the

9

See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Homegroum Justice:

The State Constitution, in

DEVELOPMENTS iN STATE CONS'nTInONAL LAW 315 (Bradley McGraw ed., 1985).
101 SELECEM WRTINGS OF ARTHUR T. VANDEmiLT 28 (Fannie J. Klein & Joel S.

Lee eds., 1967).
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oral advocate should play an active role in writing the brief; this can
enhance the advocate's level of confidence.
It is not uncommon for counsel admitted pro hac vice to argue
before a state's highest court. Before appearing, counsel should determine how many votes are needed -to win in that state's highest
court. Twenty-five states have seven justices orjudges, eighteen states
have five justices orjudges, six states have nine justices orjudges, and
Louisiana stands alone with eight justices." Therefore, in seven
states, an oral advocate must convince five justices or judges to win
an appeal. An optimist might suggest that in those seven states, the
intent is to encourage counsel to prepare as if he or she were arguing before the United States Supreme Court.
Oral argument should be viewed as more of an art form than
brief writing. Using the judges' or justices' minds as a canvas, the
oral argument affords the attorney the opportunity to paint a Mona2
Lisa of his or her case. But like the Scarecrow in The Wizard of Oz,'
there are times when the decision can go either way. Many times, a
judge's orjustice's tentative pre-argument position changes based on
the oral argument. Careful preparations are required, but much of
an oral advocate's performance must be spontaneous.
IV. CONFERENCE

The conferences conducted in appeals after oral arguments are
perhaps the most sacred and secretive of all aspects in the appellate
process. This helps to explain why there is a great deal of mystery
surrounding the process. The "unknown" aspect of appellate courts
is one of the reasons that Bob Woodward's book The Brethren-Imide
the Supreme Court" became so popular in 1979. Little has changed
since then. Because I perceive that the public continues to be curious about the inner sanctum of our highest courts, I will share those
aspects of the process that I can without violating the rules of professional orjudicial responsibility.
The primary function of the conference is to discuss the appeal,
decide the case, assign the opinion, re-discuss the appeal after an
opinion has been circulated, critique the opinion in terms of substance and language, reconsider in light of any circulated dissenting
or concurring opinions, and then reach consensus on the opinion of

SSee Wefing, supra note 1, at 52-53.
12

1900).
13

L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ (George M. Hill Co. ed.,
BOB WooDwARD & ScorT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
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the court that is to be filed in the case. The ultimate opinion reflects
the combined thoughts of all the justices.
In our court, the conference involves a modified Socratic dialogue in that each justice is asked to express his or her thinking and
disposition of each issue raised by the parties. The chief justice, who
is appointed (the position does not rotate), presides over the conference. The chief justice calls on one of the justices to lead the discussion. Generally, the justices have no advance notice of who will
be called on to lead the discussion. Obviously, then, each justice
must be prepared to discuss each case.
Many ideas expressed at the conference are later incorporated
into the opinion. At the conclusion of those discussions, the chief
justice, if she is in the majority, assigns the opinion. When the chief
justice is in the minority, the seniorjustice in the majority assigns the
opinion. The senior justice in the minority assigns the dissenting
opinion.
My anecdotal research reveals that not all jurisdictions conduct
business the way that we do in NewJersey. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the
first Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court under the 1947
Constitution, inaugurated the practice we still follow and once criticized the ways other appellate courts conduct business. ChiefJustice
Vanderbilt was especially critical of a single-justice opinion system in
which one justice is assigned to write on a rotating basis. The chief
justice observed:
In more than half of the appellate courts in the several states,
opinions are assigned in rotation in advance of oral argument.
Judges, you can be sure, listen more attentively to the arguments
in the case where they are to write the opinion than they do to
the arguments in other cases. There is an art, I am told, of seeming to listen. In some jurisdictions the practice of rotation has
been exalted to a cardinal principle; judges have been called
upon to write an opinion for the majority of the court with which
they did not agree, but then they have been permitted to accompany such a majority opinion with a dissenting opinion of their
own expressing their true views. There are other courts in which
there is no conference at all after the argument, but the judge to
whom the case is assigned in rotation writes an opinion which is
circulated and, if nobody dissents, it becomes the opinion of the
court without any discussion in conference whatsoever. If a judge
disagrees with the opinion writer, he may prepare a dissenting
opinion and circularize it, but a mere description of this process
discloses its weaknesses. The result of internal court practices
such as this, unknown except to those on the appellate court itself, cannot but produce one-man opinions that are, in fact, a
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fraud on the litigants and the public. While the judges on courts
resorting to methods such as I have been describing have a variety of excuses for so doing, all are grounded in expediency and
cannot be justified. 4
At the conference in the case of the meat slicing machine, let us
assume that the chief justice of my court called on me to lead the
discussions. I would begin by identifying the issues presented and
my proposed resolution to those issues. In the interest of time, I
limit my reasoning to supporting the decision on each issue for the
opinion.
The jury found that the slicing machine was flawed by a defective design when the manufacturer sold it to A's employer. The
manufacturer argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the
jury to utilize the consumer-expectations test rather than a
risk/utility analysis to determine whether the slicing machine was defectively designed. I would express the view that the consumerexpectations test was the proper standard under the New Jersey
Products Liability Act. 15 The design of the slicing machine without
an interlock was "self-evidently" defective. There were no relevant
considerations that made the hazard inherent in the product or reasonably necessary to its functioning.
At the conference concerning the luxury boat, let us also assume that I was asked to lead the discussions. The manufacturer of
the luxury boat persuasively argued that a cause of action in strict liability should not be cognizable for only economic loss to the product itself. Unless a state statute requires otherwise, and NewJersey's
statutory law does not, a claim for breach of an implied warranty
should be the exclusive remedy for loss of benefit of the bargain.
The facts of the case do not compel us to decide whether a distinction should be made between a commercial purchaser and a consumer because the boat is a luxury.'
I would also discuss broader considerations such as (1) spreading of risk (a) among all customers rather than allowing the loss to
fall on one purchaser and (b) through insurance with slight premium increases throughout the industry so the cost of all similar

14

2 SELEUCED WRrINGS

OF ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT 175 (FannieJ. Klein &Joel S.

Lee eds., 1967).
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1 to -11 (West 1987) (amended 1995).

ee
eAlloway v. General Marine Indus., 149 N.J. 620, 626, 632-42, 695 A.2d 264,
267, 270-75 (1997); Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 580,
489 A.2d 660, 672-73 (1985); RESTATEmEN (THIRD) OF ToRTS: PRODUC LIABILnY §
21(1997).
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products reflects the loss and (2) how the statutes of limitations in
warranty actions (four years from sale) versus products liability actions (two years from loss) would affect the claims. The availability
of insurance would also be considered.
V.

THE OPINION-TEACHING V. LAWMAKING

A.
The justices are viewed as monks in the high judicial cloister
who speak only when an opinion emerges. Unlike the Vatican when
a new Pope is elected, we generally do not send any signals when an
opinion is about to emerge.
The opinion in a case serves two significant purposes: (1) dispute resolution and (2) lawmaking or teaching from above. The
dispute resolution is exclusively made at the conference, while the
lawmaking largely occurs in the writing of the opinion. Structurally,
the opinion is that portion of the appeal that is preserved in the
vault of stare decisis. In some instances, the opinion becomes part of
the literature of the law.
The opinion should reflect that the scales of justice are balanced and steady. At the same time, the opinion must reflect an
awareness of the impact the court's opinion will have on the parties
to the case and on society in general, while also recognizing the need
for stability in the law without stagnation. That process generally requires a delicate balancing of various considerations, including the
views of the dissenting and concurring justices.
Appellate judicial decisions are not merely the imposition of the
justices' values. They are also the products of patterns of reasoning
and justification. Those patterns generally include intellectual and
moral instincts that are shared by other justices and judges. Frequently, the patterns also identify why a particular Restatement of the
Law is accepted or rejected.
There was a time when it was virtually uncontroverted that the
mission of the Restatement was to reflect the law as it is, and to make
the law more understandable. Recently, that mission has been called
into question during the American Law Institute's (ALI) deliberations regarding the newly adopted section 2(b) of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Some commentators have suggested that the ALI's role changed from restating the law to that of
issuing pro-manufacturer political documents.7 Although that de1

See Frank Vandall, Constructinga Roof Before the Foundation Is Prepared: The Re-
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bate continues, and it appears clearer now that section 2(b) is not
the reactionary statement that it was feared to be, I will consider the
role of the Restatement in the making of decisional law.
One gains insight into whether to adopt a section of the Restatement by considering the decisional law of the state, the law of
other jurisdictions, and scholarly commentary on the issues presented.18 Dean Prosser's comments about whether legal causation
should be decided as a matter of law helps to inform the decision
whether to adopt a section of the Restatement. Dean Prosser said that
the decision whether to submit causation issues to ajury is frequently
based on policy rather than legal issues of causation:
Often to greater extent, however, the legal limitation on the
scope of liability is associated with policy-with our more or less
inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands, or of what
is administratively possible and convenient.9

Thus, it is fair to say that whether the Restatement is applied in a
given case depends on whether it furthers the policy the court wishes
to advance. Products liability law is largely policy driven. Certainly,
this notion is evident in NewJersey, beginning with the seminal case
of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.'
An independent judiciary is crucial to the appellate decisionmaking process. The existence of an independent judiciary forms
the heart and soul of the American legal system. It has been recognized since the formation of our Republic that
"[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution," The FederalistNo. 78, at
484 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888); that any "lessening [of]
the independence of the judiciary [attacks] not only the judicial
power, but the democratic republic itself," A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 289 (Vintage Books 1945); that "we would
rather have an independent Court, a fearless Court, a Court that
will dare to announce its honest opinions in what it believes to be
the defense of liberties of the people, than a Court that, out of
fear or sense of obligation to the appointing power, or factional
passion, approves any measure we may enact," S.Rep. No. 711,

statement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MIcH. J.L.
REFoRM 261, 279 (1997).
is See Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 619-20, 626 A2d 445, 461-62
(1993) (adopting section 219 of the Restatement (Second) ofAgency (1957)).
10 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTs § 41, at
264 (4th ed. 1971).
0 82 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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75th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1937) (rejecting the 1937 court-packing
plan).21
I will not debate the majoritarian and the counter-majoritarian
philosophies. I am persuaded, however, that the judicial selection
process, when viewed against a national movement for tort reform,
may have some influence, albeit lessened with extended judicial service, on the way a justice or judge votes in a given case. That conclusion is confirmed by an article published recently in the American Bar
Association Journal. It reported that a 1994 survey of state court
judges by the American Judicature Society indicated that 27.6% of
judges said that retention elections made them increasingly sensitive
to public opinion, while 15.4% conceded that they would avoid controversial rulings and cases.2 The same percentages may apply to
supreme court justices because 67.6% of them had prior judicial experience" and at least half of the states use some form of judicial
elections. 4
Professor Daniel R. Pinello has concluded from an empirical
study that judges and justices who are selected by an appointment
process are likely to be more independent than those who are
elected.u If that statistical model applies to state supreme courts, an
advocate in a controversial case may lose almost two justices' votes
based on the selection process. An advocate in such a case would be
left with the daunting task of winning four of five remaining votes on
a seven-justice court.
An independent judiciary, however, should not be viewed as
having a license to legislate. In products liability cases, as in other
areas of the law, there must be an appreciation of the relative roles of
the legislative and judicial branches in defining rights and duties.
While an independent judiciary has considerable latitude in deter-

21 In re

Randolph, 101 NJ. 425, 435-36, 502 A.2d 533, 583 (1986).
&eJohn Gibeaut, Taking Aiv, 82 A.B.A.J. 50, 53 (Nov. 1996).
23 &eWefing, supra note
1, at 80.
24 State supreme court justices are elected in partisan elections in Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, and West Virginia. Non-partisan contested elections are held in Georgia,
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Peter Applebome, Texas Court Fight
Puts Focus on ElectedJudges, N.Y. Tnms,Jan. 22,1988, at B4.

"Yes-no" retention elections are currently utilized in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See id.
25 See DANIEL R. PINaLLO, THo IMPACr OF JUDICAL-SELw'rON METHOD ON STATESUPREME COURT POUCY:

INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY

142-43 (1995).
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mining rights and duties, it must be mindful of the role the legislative and executive branches play.
The role of appellate courts in providing stability without stagnation is two-fold. At times, they must change the law to respond to
changing times. Occasionally, they must also change the law to force
the times to change. A court that strikes a proper balance between
the two is characterized as moderate. A court that goes too far in either direction is characterized as liberal or conservative, depending
upon the direction it takes.
New Jersey has been in the vanguard of products liability jurisprudence. We abandoned the "buyer beware" and "privity" concepts
in defective-product-injury cases in 1960 and applied implied warranty principles." Five years later we adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 The same principle was also applied to
leased 2products and to products contained in mass-produced
homes. We view the social policy underlying the law of products liability as "spreading the risk to society at large for the cost of injuries
from defective products."" I suspect that social philosophy contributed to tort reform.
Under the pre-tort reform economic paradigm, the underlying
policy question was which party is the "cheapest cost avoider." We
asked which party "is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis
between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made." ' NewJersey concluded that a manufacturer is in
a better position to make this decision than a factory employee or a
typical product user. Those were policy decisions made by the judicial branch until the executive and legislative branches of government found tort reform to be politically beneficial.
The tort reform movement of the 1980s and 1990s was no doubt
fueled in part by proactive judges' and justices' expansions of evolvSee Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 378-84, 161 A.2d 69,
80-84 (1960).
See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207 A.2d 305, 311
(1965).
" See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 NJ. 434, 452, 212 A.2d
769,779 (1965).
&e Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965).
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 NJ. 332, 350, 431 A.2d 811, 820 (1981);
accord Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 169-72, 406 A.2d 140,
149-50 (1979); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 146-52, 305 A.2d 412, 421-24
(1973).
31 Guido Calabresi & John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YAIE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
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ing common law. The self-regulating mechanism known as judicial
restraint was perceived as ineffectual by some members of the legislative and executive branches of government.
That perception
prompted some members of the other two branches of government,
and some academics, to pose a question similar to the one Roman
poet DecimusJuniusJuvenal (55-130 A.D.) asked in another context
when questioning Plato's Republic: "But who is to guard the guards
themselves?" 2 The modern day response to that ancient question
was tort reform.
Approximately ten years ago, New Jersey and other jurisdictions
became part of a national tort reform movement. New Jersey
adopted its Products Liability Act in 1987."" In 1991, four years after
NewJersey enacted this law, the ALI initiated a project to reform the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and to create the Restatement (Third) of
Torts. Some of the recent debates that preceded the adoption of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability in May 1997 suggest that
a new economic paradigm of products liability has been created." I
do not believe, however, that an independent judiciary will interpret
new legislation and the Restatement (Third) of Torts as an economic
vehicle divorced from social and humanistic concerns. Indeed,
Judge Dreier has identified many areas in which section 2(b) does
not change the existing law in some jurisdictions.3
B.
We turn now to applying the foregoing principles to the first
hypothetical involving the slicing machine. Recall that the machine
was manufactured and sold to the plaintiff's employer in 1980, and
the accident occurred in 1994.
The New Jersey Products Liability Act (the Act), adopted
roughly eight years before the slicing machine accident, should be
applied. Section 2 of the Act defines a defective product as one that
was not "reasonably fit, suitable, or safe for its intended purpose" because of a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or a warning de-

32 JoHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS

109 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).

" 1987 N.J. Laws 197, § 7 (effectiveJuly 22, 1987) (codified at NJ. STAT. ANN.

§

2A:58C-1 to -7 (West 1987) (amended 1995)).

See generaly ROscOE POUND FOUNDATION, PossiBi

STATE COURT RESPONSES TO
REPORT OF THE 1996

THE AI's PROPOSED RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILTY,

FORUm FOR STATE COURTJUDGES (1997).

See genera!!y William A. Dreier, Design Defects Under the Proposed Section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability-A Judge's View, 30 U. MIcH. J.L.
REFORm 221 (1997).
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fect.' Section 2 of the Restatement incorporates the same three categories of product defects."7
Suppose the manufacturer of the slicing machine relies on the
statutory defense that, at the time the product left its control in
1980, "there was not a practical and technically feasible alternative
design that would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product."-" Thus, the Act converted a single factor in a common-law
risk/utility analysis into an absolute state of the art affirmative defense." Section 2(b) of the Restatement provides the same defense.
Thus, before section 2(b) of the Restatemet was adopted, tort reform
in NewJersey changed the methodology of analyzing products liability cases.'
The manufacturer's alternative-design defense must fail in the
slicing machine case. Under our Act, a manufacturer bears the burden of proof of that defense, while under section 2(b), the plaintiff
must prove that a reasonable alternative existed. Under our case law,
not changed by theAct, the manufacturer must prove the technological state-of-the-art when the product was manufactured, and a
plaintiff must prove that the product deviated from the state-of-theart. Under both the Act and section 2(b), counsel and the courts
will have to deal with the emerging scientific evidence discussed in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.4 ' and GeneralElectric Co. v.
Joiner.4
The evidence reveals that an alternative design existed and that
the machine the plaintiff used deviated from the state-of-the-art because the machine could readily have been manufactured with an interlock. Interlock technology had been used for many years in various industries at the time the slicer was manufactured, including the
food industry. In 1980, however, no food slicer had incorporated an
interlock that would be triggered by the removal of the guard. In
1984, the manufacturer discontinued production of the machine the
plaintiff was using and introduced a new model. The new machine
was substantially identical to the old machine in appearance and opeSee N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987) (amended 1995).
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRi) OF TORTS: PRODUCTSLIABIrIY§
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1987) (amended

2 (1997).
1995).
39 See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 NJ. 69, 96, 577 A.2d 1239,
1252-53 (1990); Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., 258 N.J. Super. 261, 271, 609 A.2d
487, 492 (App. Div. 1992).
40 See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 96, 577A.2d
at 1252-53.
41 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
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eration except that the newer version was built with a blade interlock. There was no change in the relative technology between 1980
and 1984. The manufacturer did not remotely suggest that the incorporation of a blade guard interlock impaired the functionality of
the machine. Although there was some dispute about the feasibility
and cost of retrofitting the old machines with blade guard interlocks,
both of the experts presented by the parties agreed that modifying
the design to incorporate the interlocks during production would
not have required either a substantial design effort or a significant
additional cost.
Next, I turn to whether the risk/utility standard or the consumer-expectations test should have been applied to this case. The
manufacturer's argument that the trial judge erroneously instructed
the jury to utilize the consumer-expectations test rather than the
risk/utility analysis to determine whether the machine was defectively designed should be rejected.
Although the Act defines the standard for determining the adequacy of warnings, 3 it does not define the standard for determining
when a design defect has caused a product not to be "reasonably fit,
suitable, or safe for its intended purpose."" Therefore, the Act must
be read in conjunction with our decisional law to determine whether
a design defect exists.
Unlike a manufacturing defect, where the focus is on whether
the particular product was manufactured according to design specifications, a design defect case focuses on whether the design specifications used to manufacture an entire product line created an unreasonable risk. To answer that question, the court must apply a
standard that goes beyond the manufacturer's specifications. The
standards utilized in New Jersey are the consumer-expectations test
and the risk/utility standard.
Under our common-law risk/utility standard, the usual multipart test looks at factors such as the availability of an alternative design, the usefulness, desirability and safety aspects of a product, and
the manufacturer's ability to eliminate unsafe characteristics without
impairing the usefulness or increasing the cost of the product.45
Under the Restatement the factors considered are the availability of
an alternative design and whether "the omission of the alternative

§ 2A:58C-4 (West 1987) (amended 1995).

43

See NJ. STAT. ANN.

4

NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987) (amended 1995).

43 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150, 181-82, 406 A.2d

140, 155-56 (1979) (Clifford,J., concurring).
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design renders the product not reasonably safe" for use.* The Restatement points out that this "reasonable alternative design" is a nonexclusive test in unusual cases. 7 It "is the predominant, yet not exclusive, method for establishing defective design. " '*
The "risk/utility analysis provides the flexibility necessary for an
appropriate adjustment of the interests of manufacturers, consumers, and the public."" Furthermore, the risk/utility analysis includes
other factors such as the state-of-the-art at the time of the manufacture of the product."°
The risk/utility analysis is an objective test that focuses on the
product. The consumer-expectations test is more subjective but it
also focuses on the product. The consumer-expectations test was
recognized in New Jersey in 1979 at the same time the risk/utility
analysis was also accepted." We apply a narrow version of the consumer-expectations test. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine
Co., the court instructed that the consumer-expectations test is applicable only where the product, like "a bicycle whose brakes did not
hold because of an improper design," is "self-evident[ly] ...not reasonably suitable and safe and fails to perform, contrary to the user's
reasonable expectation that it would 'safely do the jobs for which it
was built.'" 2
I am persuaded that the trial court properly applied the consumer-expectations test in the slicing machine case. The accident
occurred while the plaintiff was cleaning the machine. A delicatessen slicing machine cannot be used satisfactorily without frequent
and thorough cleaning of its blade. The manufacturer contemplated that the blade would be cleaned while it was revolving. A food
slicing machine that is designed to be cleaned without the guard in
place and while the blade is revolving is clearly not "reasonably fit,
suitable, or safe for its intended purpose. " "
It is apparent that in this design defect case, some negligence
principles have been applied. The establishment of a design defect
4RES

Ar

(THIRD) oFTogrs: PRODUCTS LIABILr§ 2(b) (1997).

47 &eREsTATEMENT

(THIW) oFTORTS: PRODus LABILY § 2 cmt. b (1997).
Id.
49 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 183, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983).
50 See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 NJ. 152, 174, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27
(1978).
SSee Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150, 170-71, 406 A.2d
140, 149-50 (1979).
52 Id. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc.,
377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)).
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987) (amended 1995).
4
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requires proof of what a reasonable manufacturer would do once it
knows that its product is dangerous. This focuses on the manufacturer's conduct rather than on the product. Therefore, by having to
prove that the manufacturer's process contributed to the defective
design, some negligence principles are necessarily applied. Under
both strict liability and negligence principles, a manufacturer of a
product is deemed to be an expert in the design and manufacture of
that product, and is required to keep up with advances in its industry." In addition, although the plaintiff could not be found contributorily negligent by virtue of the Act and our common law, the
jury was nonetheless permitted to consider his knowledge as relevant
to the issue of causation. More specifically, in a design defect case, a
consumer's or user's knowledge of the danger represented by a
product raises a question about whether the ultimate injury was
caused by the dangerous product or by the conduct of the user in
the face of this danger. Here, the jury concluded that the design defect was the proximate cause of the injury. I doubt that the conclusion would be different under the Restatement.
C.
Finally, I turn to the hypothetical involving the boat. Recall that
the plaintiff seeks damages for the cost of repair and for the boat's
loss of value at trade-in. There is no allegation that other property
was damaged or that anyone sustained personal injuries.
Ordinarily, economic loss encompasses actions for a recovery of
damages for the cost of repairs, replacement of defective goods, inadequate value, and consequential loss of profits.5 Economic loss
further includes "the diminution in the value of the product because
it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes
for which it was manufactured and sold."6
The real question posed is whether the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed with a products liability design defect claim or
whether the damages should be limited to contract principles.
"Generally speaking, tort principles ... are better suited for resolving

claims" for personal injuries or damages to other property."

Con-

See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 NJ. 429, 452-53, 479 A.2d 374, 386-87 (1984).
See IjAIEsJ. W-rrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 114 to 11-6, at 534-40 (3d ed. 1988); see also Note, Economic Loss In ProductsLiability Jusr
ce, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966).
Comment, Manufacturers' Liability To Remote Purchasers For 'Economic Loss"
Damage.-Tortor Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. Riv. 539, 541 (1966).

Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 57980, 489 A.2d
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tract principles are better suited to resolving claims for economic
Implicit in the
loss caused by damage to the product itself "'
tort/contract distinction is the notion that a tort duty of care protects against the risk of accidental harm, whereas a contractual duty
preserves the satisfaction of consensual obligations.
Also relevant to the distinction is the relative bargaining power
of the parties and the allocation of the loss to the better risk-bearer
in a modem marketing system. Although a manufacturer may be in
a better position to absorb the risk of loss from physical injury or
property damage, a purchaser may be better situated to absorb the
risk of economic loss caused by the purchase of a defective product.
The purchaser of a luxury item such as a boat can easily guard
against the risk of loss by purchasing insurance. In addition, when
NewJersey adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), it embraced a comprehensive system for compensating consumers for
economic loss arising from the purchase of defective products." The
U.C.C. represents the legislature's attempt to strike a proper balance
in the allocation of the risk of loss between manufacturers and purchasers for economic loss arising from injuries caused by defective
products.
Last term, our court in Alloway v. General Marine Industriesr
joined the rest of the country in holding that, under this hypothetical, the plaintiff is limited to pursuing an implied warranty claim and
may not pursue a products liability cause of action. Since our court
decided Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,61 permitting a strict liability claim against a manufacturer for loss of value of a defective carpet, NewJersey subsequently adopted the Products Liability Act (the
Act). Under the Act, the definition of "harm" means "physical damage to property, other than to the product itself." 2 Similarly, the Restatement excludes economic harm to the product itself as a recoverable item in a products liability claim.63 Section 21, comment d, states
that "[w]hen a product defect results in harm to the product itself,
the law governing commercial transactions sets forth a comprehensive scheme governing the rights of the buyer and seller.""

660, 672 (1985).

See id. at 580, 489 A.2d at 672.

See id. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
149 N.J. 620, 695 A.2d 264 (1997).
61 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:58C-1 (b) (2) (a) (West 1987) (amended 1995).
Se REsrATMENT (THmD) oFToRTs: PRODUCTS LaBriY§ 21 (1997).
60

Id. cmt. d.
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I leave for another day whether section 21 of the Restatement
should be applied to consumer goods. The implied warranty expires
after four years from the date of purchase of the product. For many
consumer products, such as heating units and refrigerators, the expected life of the product exceeds ten years. Thus, the four-year
statute of limitations appears to be too harsh as applied to these
goods.
VI. CONCLUSION
I began by stating that an opinion has two main purposes: (1)
dispute resolution and (2) lawmaking. Issue-framing for an opinion
writer is as important as it is for a brief writer. Unless the issues are
clearly identified, the opinion is likely to be poorly organized. The
writer should frame the issues before making a long factual presentation. I usually state the type of case and the principal issue in the
first sentence of the opinion and then follow with the court's holding. The writer should use plain language at all times. The writer
should avoid using "fifty cent" words, Latin expressions, legalese, obscure terms, and inflated language. Clarity and precision are key.
A signed opinion has advantages and disadvantages. Above all,
it tells the world who to blame for mistakes. The most famous opinion writer of all time, "per curiam," cannot be blamed. The truth of
the matter is that signed opinions should also be consensus or
teamwork opinions. Whether written by "per curiam" or a named
judge or justice, the opinion should always represent the combined
efforts of the court. As Judge Learned Hand explained, the institution of the courts should be the primary focus and not the individual
proclivities of the judges. 6 Although an appellate court is comprised
of individual contributors, the court as an institution represents
more than the sum of its parts.
Good opinion writing involves creativity. Justice Cardozo once
said, "I have grown to see that the [judicial] process in its highest
reaches is not discovery, but creation. .. "" Judge Learned Hand
said essentially the same thing when he wrote, "I like to think that
the work of a judge is an art.... It is what a poet does, it is what a
sculptor does." 7
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HAND, TmE Bau. OF RiGHTs 71-72 (1958).
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The tone and breadth of an opinion reflect the writer's style.
Some judges and justices paint in bold colors, while others work in
pastels. Some view their opinions as masterpieces such as the Sistine
Chapel or a Mona Lisa. I prefer to view my opinions as an Art
Buchwald article that is simple, direct and strikes one as a still-life watercolor.
In the area of products liability law, judges and justices are both
consumers of products and law givers. This dichotomy may influence ajudge to "think feelingly. " " Appellate judges and justices, like
trial judges, make choices that reflect their perceptions of the judicial role. "Ajudge's perception of community values influences such
basic choice as the... interpretation of a [products liability] statute,
[and] the extension of the common law."69
Brush stroke by brush stroke, appellate judicial opinions in New
Jersey, and perhaps across the country, have been painting a new jurisprudence of products liability since the tort reform movement
commenced in the 1980s. In NewJersey, we have abrogated a common-law products liability cause of action outside of the statute when
a design defect in consumer products only causes damage to the
0 We have
product itself."
also departed from our common law and
have held that the manufacturer of component parts to be assembled into a machine or a finished product has no duty to warn unless
a design or manufacturing defect is proven."' Despite our prior decisional law,72 we recendy adopted section 5 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: ProductsLiability.'
Some respectable lawyers and scholars will not be submitting
advance bids to Sotheby's for the emerging portrait of products liability jurisprudence for the twenty-first century. Neitherjudges nor
artists can totally escape the time and place in which they live. To
some extent, judicial opinions rendered by independent judges and
justices are likely to reflect some of the pressures of the time. Our
cutting-edge decisions in Henningsen and Suter may represent New
Paul Gewirtz, On "IKnow It When I See It," 105 YALz L.J. 1023, 1032 (1996)
(discussingjudicial perspective on pornography).
69 Stewart G. Pollock, Th7e Art of Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 591, 595 (1996)
(discussing artistry ofjudicial work).
70 &eAlloway v. General Marine Indus., 149 N.J.
620, 643-44, 695 A.2d 264, 27576 (1997) (Handler,J., concurring).
71 See Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 144 N.J. 34, 58-63, 675
A.2d 620, 632-35
(1996).
See Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 397-402, 451 A.2d
179, 184-87 (1982).
73 RESTATEMENT (THID)
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Jersey's finest contributions to the changing products liability jurisprudence."
The critical lesson to be learned from tort reform is that in the
meandering course of products liability jurisprudence there is time
for visions and revisions. As they say on Wall Street, the market corrects itself.

14 See, e.g., Sheila L. Bimbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Neglige=ce, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980).

